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SIXTH AMENDMENT-INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS AND THE
BRUTON RULE
Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979).
INTRODUCTION
There has been a great deal of controversy and
conflict among the federal and state courtsi con-
cerning the admissibility of a codefendant's confes-
sion that incriminates a defendant who has also
confessed. In Bruton v. United States2 the Supreme
Court held that admission of a codefendant's
confession which implicated Bruton violated
his rights under the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment' because the codefendant did not
take the stand and thus could not be cross-exam
I The conflict extends throughout the courts of ap-
peals. For cases applying Bruton in the context of inter-
locking confessions, see Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643
(6th Cir. 1978), United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). Other
courts have implicitly applied Bruton. See Hull v. Wolff,
539 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1976): Glinsey v. Parker. 491
F.2d 337 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (i974);
Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 943 (1970); United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Yeager, 399 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1027 (1969).
For cases holding that Bruton does not apply, see
United States ex rel. Duff v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); United States
ex rel. Cantanzara v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970). Other courts have
held that Bruton does not apply or that if it does the error
was harmless. See Mack v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Walton, 538 F.2d 1348 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976); United States v.
Spinks, 470 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011
(1972); Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207 (10th Cir.
1971); United States ex rel. Dukes v. Wallack, 414 F.2d
246 (2d Cir. 1969).
State courts are also divided over the issue. Compare,
e.g., Stewart v. State, 257 Ark. 753, 519 S.W.2d 733
(1975) and People v. Moll, 26 N.Y.2d 1, 307 N.Y.S.2d
876, 256 N.E.2d 185, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911 (1970) with
People v. Rosochacki, 41 Ill. 2d 483; 244 N.E.2d 136
(1969) and State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273 A.2d 867
(1970).
2 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
3 U.S. CONSr. amend. VI. The amendment provides
that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." This right was applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965).
ined.4 Despite the general rule that a court will rely
upon the jury to follow its instructions, the Court
held that "there are some contexts in which the
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instruc-
tions is so great, and the consequences of failure so
vital to the defendant, that the practical and hu-
man limitations of the jury system cannot be ig-
nored." 5
Unlike the situation in Bruton, the defendants in
Parker v. Randolph6 each confessed. Thus the issue
before the Court was whether "Bruton requires re-
versal of a defendant's conviction when the defend-
ant himself has confessed and his confession 'inter-
locks' with and supports the confession of his co-
defendant. ' '
Unfortunately, the Court has left this question
and conflict unresolved. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Chief Justice and for Justices Stewart and
White, held that the Bruton rule was inapplicable
when the defendants' confessions "interlocked"
with one another.8 Rehnquist argued that when a
defendant has admitted his own guilt, "the incrim-
inating statements of a codefendant will seldom, if
ever, be of the 'devastating' character referred to
in Bruton."9 Thus, a clear instruction to the jury by
the trial court is a sufficient safeguard of the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation.
Justice Blackmun held that there was a Bruton error
but it was harmless.10 Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed with Justice
Blackmun that it was an error under Bruton to
admit interlocking confessions but coicluded that
the error was not harmless." Justice Stevens argued
that "the concurrent findings of the District Court
and the Court of Appeals that the error was not
harmless preclude this Court from reaching a dif-
ferent result of this kind of issue.'
12
4 This decision has been applied retroactively by the
Court in Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
' Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 135.6 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979).71d. at 2135.
aId. at 2140.
91d. at 2139.
10 Id. at 2141 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Id. at 2143 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 Id. Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS
FACTS AND HISTORY
As noted by the court of appeals, the sequence
of events involved in Parker "have the flavor of the
old West before the law ever crossed the Pecos.'
3
William Douglas, a professional gambler, had been
using marked cards to cheat Robert Wood in a
series of poker games. Realizing he had been
cheated, Robert Wood planned a robbery of the
next game. He received the support of his brother,
who enlisted the aid of the three defendants, Ran-
dolph, Dickens, and Hamilton. Contrary to the
plan, Robert Wood fatally shot Douglas before the
defendants knocked down the door to perpetrate
the robbery.
When the three defendants were captured, each
confessed to his involvement in the crime. Several
police officers testified to the defendants' confes-
sions at the murder trial. Since none of the defend-
ants took the stand at the joint trial, the Tennessee
trial court instructed the jury that each confession
could only be used against the defendant who gave
it and could not be considered as evidence of a
codefendant's guilt. 4 The jury returned a guilty
verdict against all three defendants.'
5
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals re-
versed the convictions. 6 The court held that the
admission of interlocking confessions at the joint
trial was contrary to Bruton.'
7
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the
state's criminal appellate court by limiting the
applicability of Bruton to situations in which the
confession inculpated a nonconfessing defendant.
The state supreme court concluded that "'[t]he
fact that jointly tried codefendants have confessed
precludes a violation of the Bruton rule where the
confessions are similar in material aspects.""1
8
The United States District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee granted the defendants' ap-
13 575 F.2d 1178, 1179 (6th Cir. 1978).
1499S. Ct. at 2136.
5
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402 (1975) provides:
Murder in the First Degree-An individual com-
mits murder in the first degree if... (4) he commits
a willfull, deliberate and malicious killing or murder
during the perpetration of an arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or
unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
;6 99 S. Ct. at 2136. The Tennessee Court of Criminal
Apleals decision was unpublished.
Id.
18 Id. (citing Tennessee v. Elliot, 524 S.W.2d 473, 477-
78 (Tenn. 1975)). The Tennessee Supreme Court decision
has not been published.
plications for writs of habeas corpus, ruling their
rights under Bruton had been violated. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the district court, explicitly rejecting the
interlocking confession theory. 20 The court stated:
"[I1n no instance has the Supreme Court overruled
Bruton or suggested that either identity or greater
or lesser similarity of confessions presented by hear-
say and without confrontation served to make them
admissible."
2 1
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
on the Bruton issue.22Justice Rehnquist, writing for
a plurality of four, held that the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment is not violated when
the codefendants' confessions interlock and the trial
court gives the proper limiting instructions to the
jury.23 He noted that "[tihe 'rule'-indeed, the
premise upon which the system of jury trials func-
tion under the American judicial system-is that
juries can be trusted to follow the trial court's
instructions. " ' Bruton, therefore, represents an ex-
ception to this general rule.
Rehnquist acknowledged the reasons for the ex-
ception to the general rule. Citing Bruton, he noted
that "'there are some contexts in which the risk
that thejury will not, or cannot, follow instructions
is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital
to the defendant, that the practical and human
limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored. ' ' 25 Rehnquist also argued that another
aspect of the Bruton case was that the credibility of
the codefendant's statement was "inevitably sus-
pect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take
the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh their
testimony carefully given the recognized motiva-
tion to shift the blame onto others."
26
19 99 S. Ct. at 2136. The U.S. District Court opinion
was unpublished.
0 Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178, 1183 (6th Cir.
1978).
21 id.
22 The Supreme Court affirmed the granting of habeas
corpus relief to respondent Dickens on the grounds that
his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
had been violated. 99 S. Ct. at 2141.
2 99 S. Ct. at 2140. Generally the court is required to
give a clear instruction to the jury that each confession
can only be used against the defendant who gave it and
cannot be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt.
24 Id. at 2140 n.7.
5 Id. at 2137-38 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. at 135-36).




Recognizing these criteria as being necessary to
apply the Bruton exception, Rehnquist argued that
where a defendant has admitted his guilt, incrim-
inating statements from his codefendant's confes-
sion "will seldom, if ever, be of 'devastating' char-
acter referred to in Bruton." 27 In a situation where
a defendant has maintained his innocence, the
Court recognized in Bruton that incriminating state-
ments by the codefendant will probably weigh
heavily in the jury's determination of the guilt or
innocence of the defendant, despite instruction by
the court. In the case where the defendant has
himself confessed, and his confession interlocks
with his codefendant's confession, Rehnquist ar-
gued that the codefendant's statements would not
be damaging to the defendant because the jury
would concentrate on the defendant's confes-
sion. Even if the defendant was allowed to cross-
examine and impeach the statements by his code-
fendant, it would do him little good since he has
admitted committing the crime in his own confes-
sion. Thus, Rehnquist felt the constitutional right
of cross-examination "has far less practical value
to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than
to one who has consistently maintained his inno-
cence.
" 2s
Furthermore, Rehnquist argued that in the case
of interlocking confessions the codefendant's state-
ments are not inevitably suspect. Since the defend-
ant has himself admitted to and thus corroborated
the codefendant's allegations, the codefendant's
statement is not suspect because of the possibility
he may be attempting to shift the blame onto the
defendant.s
Rehnquist concluded that where a confessing
codefendant has not taken the stand but has im-
plicated a defendant who has made no admission
of his guilt, the limiting instructions to the jury
cannot be accepted as adequate safeguards of the
defendant's rights under the confrontation clause.30
However, when the defendant's confession is before
the jury, Rehnquist felt that "the constitutional
scales tip the other way.',
3 1
The possible prejudice resulting from the failure of
the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not
so "devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defend-
ant to require departure from the general rule al-
lowing admission of evidence with limiting instruc-





tions. We therefore hold that admission of interlock-
ing confessions with proper limiting instructions
conforms to the requirements of the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. 3
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion and
Justice Stevens writing for the dissent, disagreed
with the plurality because they felt that a Bruton
violation had occurred at the trial of the defend-
ants.*3 In finding a constitutional error, Stevens
focused his analysis on a major assumption behind
the Bruton decision. This assumption was that the
jury cannot or will not follow the court's instruction
to disregard incriminating statements made in the
codefendant's confessibn.34 Because such an in-
struction provides an inadequate safeguard of the
defendant's sixth amendment rights, Stevens ar-
gued that "the controlling question [in applying
the Bruton rule] must be whether it is realistic to
assume that the jury followed the judge's instruc-
tions to disregard those confessions when it was
evaluating [the defendant's] guilt. ' 35
Stevens argued that the plurality opinion was
incorrect in assuming that a jury has more ability
to disregard a codefendant's inadmissible incrimi-
nating statements against the defendant when the
defendant's own confession is part of the evidence..
6
For example, Stevens hypothesized a situation in
which codefendant y confessed to a murder and
also implicated defendant x. Defendant x made a
vague statement to a drinking partner saying that
he was with y at the approximate time of the
killing. All other evidence is circumstantial. In such
a situation, Stevens argued that the confession of
codefendant y certainly would be devastating to x.
In fact, the presence of x's own confession might
actually increase the probability that the jury
would consider y's statement in determining x's
guilt.3 7 Stevens concluded that "[elvidence that a
defendant has made an 'extra-judicial admission of
guilt' which 'stands before the jury unchallenged,'
... is not an acceptable reason for depriving him




33 Id. at 2143 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2143
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
' Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 129 (citing
Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
3 99 S. Ct. at 2147 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61d. at 2145.
3
7 Id. at 2145-46.
-18 d. at 2145.
INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS
Rather than adopting a per se rule that Bruton is
inapplicable in an interlocking confession situation,
both Blackmun and the dissenting Justices would
have applied the harmless error test.3 The Court
has applied this test in previous cases involving
Bruton violations. For example, in Harrington v. Cal-
ifornia,4  two codefendants' statements admitted at
trial placed Harrington at the scene of the crime,
but the codefendants never took the stand. The
Court, in deciding whether this Bruton violation
required reversal of the defendant's conviction,
applied the rule that "'before a federal constitu-
tional error can be held harmless, the court must
be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.',41 Under such a test,
the finding of a Bruton violation during the course
of a trial does not automatically require reversal of
the criminal conviction. The Court stated in Schne-
ble v. Florida:42 "In some cases the properly admitted
evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the pre-
judicial effect of the codefendant's admission is so
insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond
a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the
admission was harmless error."
43
ANALYSIS
The dispute between the plurality and the dis-
sent concerned the issue of when a jury should be
relied upon to follow a court's instructions. Because
the plurality and the dissent rely upon different
pri;, :iples found in Bruton to answer this question,
they reach different conclusions.
Stevens noted Bruton rejected the assumption of
the Court in Delli Paoli v. United States4
4 that a jury
can follow a court's instructions to ignore a code-
fendant's confession when it determines the defend-
ant's guilt. When the Court in Bruton overruled
Delli Paoli, it relied heavily on the reasoning it had
previously used in Jackson v. Denno.45 In Jackson, the
Court held that the New York procedure allowing
a jury to hear the contents of a confession and at
the same time determine whether it was voluntarily
given violated the due process clause. The Court
in Jackson believed that after hearing the contents
of a confession, a jury would be biased against
deciding it was involuntary, and even if it did
39 Id.; id. at 2141 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
40 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
4 ld. at 251 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967)).
42 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
43 Id. at 430.
44 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
45 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
decide it was involuntary, it would be unable to
ignore the confession when it was determining the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. 6
Applying the reasoning found in Jackson, the
Court in Bruton concluded that a jury cannot use a
codefendant's confession when it is determining the
codefendant's guilt and later ignore the confession
when it is determining the defendant's guilt. The
California Supreme Court had earlier applied this
reasoning in reaching the same conclusion. Justice
Traynor wrote in People v. Aranda:4 7 "A jury cannot
'segregate evidence into separate intellectual
boxes....' It cannot determine that a confession is
true insofar as it admits that A has committed
criminal acts with B and at the same time effec-
tively ignore the inevitable conclusion that B has
committed those same criminal acts with A.",
48
Stevens argued that the inability of the jury to
segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes
requires separate trials if a codefendant's confession
implicating the defendant is to be used as evidence
against the codefendant.49 He felt the plurality
incorrectly assumed that ajury would be more able
to disregard a codefendant's inadmissible confes-




Justice Rehnquist, however, emphasized that it
is the general rule that the court will rely upon the
jury to follow its instructions. 5' Bruton is an excep-
tion to this rule which should be applied only when
a two-part test is met. First, the jury must be
unable to follow the court's instructions for the
reasons noted above, and second, the consequences
of such a failure must be vital to the defendant.52
This would occur when the incriminating state-
ments are devastating to the defendant. Since Jus-
tice Rehnquist felt that when there are interlocking
confessions the effect on the defendant would "sel-
dom, if ever," be devastating, he concluded that a
clear jury instruction is adequate protection of the
46 Id. at 388.
4763 Cal. 2d 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265
(1965).
4 Id. at 529, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 360, 407 P.2d at 272.
" Redacting all references to the defendant is another
solution but is often ineffective or impossible especially
when the confession is introduced by a witness. For
example, in Parker all references by a confessing defendant
to other defendants were replaced with the words "blank"
or "other person." But as the court of appeals noted, the
confessions left "no possible doubt in the jurors' minds
concerning the 'person[sJ' referred to." 575 F.2d at 1180.
50 99 S. Ct. at 2145 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5' 99 S. Ct. at 2139.52 1d. at 2137.
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defendant's rights under the confrontation clause. 3
Thus, Justice Rehnquist did not necessarily assume
that the ability of a jury to ignore a codefendant's
implicating statements in determining the defend-
ant's guilt or innocence is enhanced when the
defendant has confessed. Rather, he was balancing
the advantages of having joint trials' against the
possibility of infringing on the defendant's right to
confront witnesses against him. When a defend-
ant's own confession is before the jury, the "consti-
tutional scales" tip against overriding "the theoret-
ically sound premise that ajury will follow the trial
court's instructions." 2 According to Rehnquist,
"[t]he possible prejudice resulting from the failure
of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is
not so 'devastating' or 'vital' to the confessing
defendant to require departure from the general
rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting
instructions.
' '6
Thus, by relying on different principles upon
which the Bruton decision was based, the plurality
and dissent reach opposite conclusions. The dissent
found a violation because they believed the only
issue in Bruton was the ability of the jury to follow
the court's instructions. The plurality, however,
did not find an error because they felt that in
addition to the high risk that the jury would not
follow a court's instruction, the failure of the jury
to do so must be devastating to the defendant.
The cases since Bruton do little to clarify which
elements of Bruton are controlling.57 In Frazier v.
Cupp,6s for example, the Supreme Court held that
Bruton did not apply when the prosecutor made
statements implicating the defendant to which he
believed a codefendant would later testify, even
though the codefendant eventually chose not to
testify. In distinguishing the facts in Frazier from
the facts in Bruton, the Court relied upon both
principles of the Bruton case emphasized by Rehn-
quist and Stevens. The Court reasoned that "unlike
the situation in Bruton, thejury was not being asked
to perform the mental gymnastics of considering
an incriminating statement against only one of two
5ld at 2140.
" "Joint trials ... conserve state funds, diminish in-
convenience to witnesses and public authorities, and
avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial."
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 134.
6299 S. Ct. at 2140.6 Id.
5'7 As indicated earlier there has been a conflict among
the lower courts that has been evenly divided. See note I
sup ra.
m 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
defendants in a joint trial." 59 The Court also dis-
tinguished Bruton on the grounds that the statement
made by the prosecutor was not a vital part of the
case.
60
Thus, Frazier fails to clarify whether the "mental
gymnastics" criteria alone is sufficient to find a
Bruton error or whether there must in addition be
a devastating impact upon the defendant. Theo-
retically, it appears inconsistent for the Court first
to state in Bruton that the jury instruction is an
"unmitigated fiction ' '6 1 and later for the Court in
Parker to rely upon the jury instructions as an
adequate safeguard of the defendant's sixth
amendment right since there was no greater like-
lihood that the jury would be able to perform the
"mental gymnastics" required by a court's instruc-
tion in Parker than there was in Bruton. However,
the devastating effect to the defendant should the
jury fail to follow a court's instruction has consist-
ently been offered by the Court as a justification
for breaking the general rule that courts will as-
sume the jury can and will follow their directives.
In addition to the disagreement over the relative
importance of the various principles found in the
Bruton case, the dissent and the plurality differ on
whether Supreme Court cases prior to Parker im-
plied that the admission of interlocking confessions
constitutes a Bruton error. Justice Stevens argued
that the plurality opinion goes against recent Su-
preme Court cases in which the Court first found
Bruton violations and then applied the harmless
error test when there were interlocking confes-
sions.62 Justice Rehnquist, however, argued that
the Court never decided whether there was a Bruton
violation in any of these cases.63 For example, in
Brown v. United States,64 there were interlocking
59 Id. at 735.
60Id.
61 381 U.S. at 129 (citing Krulewitch v. United States,
336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
62 99 S. Ct. at 2144 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63 99 S. Ct. at 2140 n.8. The dissent argued that the
harmless error test was applied in Roberts v. Russell, 392
U.S. 293 (1968), and Hooper v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 658
(1968), both involving interlocking confessions. Rehn-
quist argued that in Roberts the defendant did not confess,
and furthermore that the Court did not decide the inter-
locking confession issue but only held that Bruton should
be applied retroactively. In Hooper, the Court merely
remanded the case to be considered in light of Bruton and
Roberts without giving an opinion.
411 U.S. 223 (1973). The defendants were convicted
ofconspiracy to ship stolen goods in interstate commerce
contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1976). Both defendants confessed that they had con-
spired to steal from the warehouse, stolen goods from the
1979]
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confessions by the codefendants, but the prosecutor
conceded that the admission of their confessions
was a violation of Brulon. s Thus, while the Court
applied the harmless error rule, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the issue of whether a Bruton violation
had occurred was not before the Court because of
the concession made by the prosecuting attorney.
66
Similarly, in Schneble v. Florida67 the Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, again ap-
plied the harmless error test when there were inter-
locking confessions. In Parker, Rehnquist argued
that the Court assumed the existence of a Bruton




Even if the plurality was correct in asserting that
the prior Court cases are irrelevant in deciding
whether there was a Bruton violation in Parker, there
are still problems with its assumption that when
there are interlocking confessions, incriminating
statements by the codefendant will not be devas-
tating to the defendant. As Justice Blackmun
pointed out, this is not necessarily the case.69 For
example, a defendant's statement may concur with
his codefendant's statement but the codefendant
may further implicate the defendant. 70 In such a
situation both elements of Bruton, the inability of
the jury to segregate each confession to each de-
fendant, and the devastating effect to the defend-
ant would be present. Yet, the plurality opinion,
in adopting a per se rule, would prohibit an ap-
pellate court from reversing a conviction on the
grounds that the codefendant's confession was ad-
mitted into evidence.
Of course, the previous situation may not meet
the plurality's definition of "interlocking confes-
sions." A major flaw of the plurality opinion is its
failure to specifically define this term and what test
would be employed in future cases to determine
whether confessions sufficiently interlock. The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court felt that the defendants'
warehouse in the past, and taken goods across state lines
to an accomplice for distribution. 411 U.S. at 224-25.
65411 U.S. at 226.
6699 S. Ct. at 2138 n.5.
67405 U.S. 427 (1972). Schneble was found guilty of
murder. He confessed that he had strangled the victim
and that the other defendant had shot her to put her out
of her misery. The codefendant's confession had impli-
cated Schneble by stating he sat in the back seat of the
car (and thus, was in a position to strangle the victim)
and that Schneble never left the codefendant alone with
the woman.
r 99 S. Ct. at 2138 n.5.
69 Id. at 2142 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
70 Id.
confessions interlocked because they "'clearly dem-
onstrated the involvement of each, as to crucial
facts such as time, location, felonious activity, and
awareness of the overall plan or scheme."'
71
Whether this is the definition the plurality had in
mind, or whether their approach requires an in-
quiry into the degree the confessions interlock is
not clear from the plurality opinion.
72
To be consistent with his reasoning, Justice
Rehnquist would have to define "interlocking
confessions" in such a manner that there would not
be a devastating effect upon the defendant. Such
a definition may be hard to achieve and even more
difficult to apply. It would be most difficult to
anticipate all the possible situations that could
arise and still ensure that there was no devastating
effect on the defendant. Even if the Court adopted
a general definition, such as everything the code-
fendant alleges must be admitted to by the defend-
ant, there would be problems. If such a definition
were interpreted strictly, the Parker decision would
probably have very little application because it is
unlikely that the confessions would match exactly.
If the definition were interpreted more liberally,
the question would remain as to how close the
confessions must interlock with one another.
The answer to this question appears to be that
the confessions must interlock enough to ensure
that there is no devastating effect upon the defend-
ant. If such a result is desired, it seems practical to
measure this criterion directly. A trial judge could
evaluate the two confessions and determine
whether each defendant's confession would be
harmless to every other defendant. This would be
an application of the "harmless error" (in this case
it would be more appropriately termed harmless
admission) test at the trial court level. Not only
would it test the plurality's major criterion directly,
but also would be using the test that has been
applied at the appellate level to judge the harm-
fulness of normal Bruton violations.73
7199 S. Ct. at 2136. In United States ex rel. Ortiz v.
Fritz, 476 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075
(1973), the court of appeals concluded that two confes-
sions interlocked, stating that "[although the three
confessions [did] not all cover the same facts, they do
interlock and are consistent as regards the slaying.... As
to motive, plot and execution of the crime they are
essentially the same." 476 F.2d at 39.
72 See 99 S. Ct. at 2142 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
73 It certainly could be argued that even ifthe plurality
adopted the "harmless admission" standard, there would
still be problems with their analysis because a trial judge
would be unable to ascertain whether or not a codefen-
dant's statements would be devastating to the defendant
[Vol. 70
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The specific definition and analysis in determin-
ing whether confessions interlock is left unclear by
the plurality. It is certain, however, that no matter
what test they were to adopt, if the plurality opin-
ion gained the support of a majority of the Court,
it would allow the admission of most interlocking
confessions at joint trials. This contrasts with Jus-
tice Blackmun's and Justice Stevens' analysis that
would place a duty on the trial court judge to
disallow such confessions unless they were properly
redacted. 74 Thus, under Stevens' and Blackmun's
analysis, the government would usually have to
have separate trials if it desired to use a code-
fendant's confession against a defendant. Further-
more, only when the trial court mistakenly allowed
the implicating confessions at a joint trial would
Stevens or Blackmun apply the harmless error test
until he has examined all the evidence. However, Rule
14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applies
such a procedure to determine the possible prejudice
resulting from a joint trial. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
74 See note 49 supra for a discussion of problems in the
redaction process.
to determine whether the Bruton infraction required
reversal of the subsequent conviction.
In conclusion, there is a great deal of conflict
among the state courts and the federal circuits
about whether a Bruton rule applies where there are
interlocking confessions.7s Justice Stevens, writing
for the dissent, argued that a court's instructions to
ajury do not safeguard a defendant's rights under
the confrontation clause in the interlocking confes-
sion cases because the members of a jury have no
more ability to segregate evidence than they do
when they only have a codefendant's confession.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, held
that when a defendant's and codefendant's confes-
sions interlock, there is seldom a devastating effect
upon the defendant. Without such an effect, Bruton
does not apply, and a proper limiting instruction
to the jury is an adequate safeguard for the de-
fendant's sixth amendment rights. Whatever test
the Court adopts in the future, a clear statement to
resolve the conflict among the lower courts is
needed.
75 See note I supra.
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